INTRODUCTION
There is a broad consensus in the United States that we incarcerate too many people for non-violent narcotics crimes.
1 One way to address that
Contrast that with the process a prisoner faced when seeking clemency from President Obama in 2016. The process had changed in a century and a half. A prisoner's father would not get to chat with the president, of course; that one degree of separation between the president and Job Smith's father has blossomed into no less than 12 discrete, successive reviews by people with different interests, values, and filters from one another. 16 A typical non-violent narcotics prisoner in 2016 likely would have filed his clemency petition through the Clemency Project 2014, 17 a special program established by the Obama Administration and five outside organizations. 18 The Clemency Project 2014 was directed towards petitioners who met certain criteria. 19 Here is a lightning-round synopsis of https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/16/new-ranking-of-u-s-presidentsputs-lincoln-1-obama-18-kennedy-judged-most-over-rated. 23, 2014) , https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/justice-department-outlines-criteria-forclemency-to-nonviolent-prisoninmates/2014/04/23/1c5e9932-cad7-11e3-95f7-7ecdde72d2ea_story.html.
19. Those criteria were:
(1) Defendant would have received a substantially lower sentence today; (2) The offense was non-violent; (3) Defendant was a low-level offender; (4) Defendant has no significant ties to large-scale criminal organizations, gangs, or cartels; (5) Defendant has served at least ten years in prison; (6) Defendant has no significant criminal history;
468
Vermont Law Review [Vol. 41:465 the harrowing review process one of those cases was subjected to as it coursed through that Clemency Project and then the Administration's review process, with each step in succession. It was:
(1) Screened by a Clemency Project staffer; (2) Sent to a lawyer for examination and summary; (3) Reviewed by a committee of three; (4) Revised, then reviewed, by a committee of five; (5) Returned to the lawyer, then returned to and reviewed by the Clemency Project as a petition; (6) Submitted to the staff of the pardon attorney, and then reviewed by that staff; (7) Reviewed by the Pardon Attorney; (8) Reviewed by the staff of the Deputy Attorney General; (9) Reviewed by the Deputy Attorney General; (10) Reviewed by the staff of the White House Counsel; (11) Reviewed by the White House Counsel; (12) And then, only then, sent the President for consideration. 20 Job Smith's father was told on the spot that President Lincoln was sparing his son's life. We cannot expect a president today to meet each clemency applicant personally. 21 Still, we can make the system more effective, fair, and efficient by removing at least some of these levels of bureaucracy. 22 This article will examine the problem, look to examples in the states and prior administrations, and describe two options for a new and thorough-yet efficient-clemency process.
(7) Defendant has demonstrated good conduct in prison; and (8) Defendant has no history of violence prior to or during his or her term of incarceration. In some iterations, the second, third, and fourth criteria were conflated, and "six" criteria were listed. See POCKET GUIDE TO THE CLEMENCY PROJECT 2014 PROCESS (WITH CHECKLIST) 8-11, https://www.stthomas.edu/media/interprofessionalcenter/PocketGuidev3.pdf (last updated July 13, 2015) (listing criteria required by the Department of Justice).
20. Mark Osler, Clementia, Obama, and Deborah Leff, 28 FED. SENT'G REP. 309, 309-10 (2016).
21. Id. In fact, that did not even work very well for Lincoln. His staff eventually learned that they had to control access to the President so that important work could be done. Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, supra note 11, at 1177 (commenting on the importance of ensuring that President Lincoln met only the "most deserving" clemency cases).
22. The current system has produced some shockingly unfair outcomes, including remarkable racial disparities. A ProPublica analysis of George W. Bush's clemency record found that, " [a] ll of the drug offenders forgiven during the Bush administration at the pardon attorney's recommendation -34 of them -were white. 
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Part II recounts how we got into this swamp, then describes the process under the Obama Administration, summarized above. It is a story that involves a dizzying array of players with very different backgrounds and tasks. Importantly, many of those charged with analyzing clemency cases are generalists; they have many and sometimes conflicting tasks other than the review of petitions for clemency.
Part III examines a few of the higher-functioning state processes for clemency and looks for commonalities. A prior federal effort also warrants discussion-President Ford's Presidential Clemency Board, which granted pardons to thousands of draft evaders and wartime deserters. 23 Finally, Part IV describes a model for a new federal clemency process based on the high-functioning systems already described. President Ford's clemency board and the structure used by productive state systems share certain key elements-most importantly, the use of a board that has some degree of independence in making its determinations.
We live in an era where bureaucracy is in the decline. Microsoft, with 6 to 12 layers of bureaucracy, has lost much of its business to a flatterstructured upstart, Google. 24 Analysts like Gary Hamel have concluded that " [t] here's no other way to put it: bureaucracy must die. We must find a way to reap the blessings of bureaucracy-precision, consistency, and predictability-while at the same time killing it. Bureaucracy, both architecturally and ideologically, is incompatible with the demands of the 21st century."
25
The complex bureaucracy we have in place to evaluate clemency is not just a bad system by modern standards. It is a corruption of the intent of those who wrote the United States Constitution. Alexander Hamilton argued that "[h]umanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed." 26 Our machine of mercy and justice is unduly fettered, and it is we who should be embarrassed. 
A. From Simplicity to Complexity
To understand the shape of the beast that is the current clemency review system, it is helpful to understand how it evolved. The process grew up organically in response to workload issues and the protection of power within the executive branch, rather than through an intentional scheme to produce efficiency or regularity. There never has been a well-considered plan employed intentionally to construct a sound and efficient federal clemency process in the modern era. However, we have that opportunity now.
Clemency itself is an ancient idea. The Code of Hammurabi contained a clemency provision, and both Greek and Roman rulers wielded the power of mercy for those condemned to punishment. 27 My own treasured possessions include an ancient Roman coin bearing the name Clementia, the Roman Goddess of governmental mercy. 28 It is a treasure, but not expensive; so many were minted that they are available for under $50.
29
Clemency was part of the fabric of government to the Romans.
30
Within the British antecedents to American law, the ability of monarchs, lords, and the church to grant clemency likely extends back to Edward the Confessor in the mid-1000s, 31 and, as part of the Jurisdiction in Liberties Act in 1535, the monarch had the sole ability to grant clemency. 
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Fewer Hands, More Mercy 471 branches of government. 34 With the Constitution's sole limitation being that it cannot be used in cases of impeachment, the Pardon Power was entrusted to the President alone and cannot be directly limited by Congress or the courts. 35 While the Constitution was still fresh and its authors active in government, President George Washington first used the pardon power in 1795 to save the lives of two condemned leaders of the Whiskey Rebellion. 36 John Adams followed Washington's lead and "pardoned participants in Fries's [R]ebellion," while Jefferson used the pardon power to free those Adams had imprisoned under the Alien and Sedition Act.
37
In those early years, there was no formalized process for the consideration of clemency. The first presidents relied at times on the advice of cabinet members, and Thomas Jefferson tended to seek out the opinion of sentencing judges and prosecutors. 38 The Secretary of State became the official custodian of pardon documents, and presidents often relied on their Attorney General for counsel as well 39 (the Attorney General was not a cabinet member at that time). 40 At times, defendants would even take their clemency petition to the sentencing judge, hoping that he might send the petition to the president with a positive recommendation. McKinley's rules survived for roughly a century, establishing a fairly simple structure: the Pardon Attorney investigated the petition and made a report and recommendation for the signature of the Attorney General, who sent it along to the President if he approved. 46 This system had three simple and non-redundant steps that involved an investigator (the Pardon Attorney), a reviewer (the Attorney General), and a decider (the President). 47 The system worked fairly well; almost every year between 1900 and 1980, there were over 100 grants of clemency, signed at regular intervals four or five times a year. 48 It is a common myth that it is "traditional" for presidents to wait until the end of their last term to grant clemencies. 49 In fact, so long as there was a simple and functioning system of review, that did not happen.
Former Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate Love has argued briefly but convincingly that a key to this success was the role of the Attorney General as the conduit to the President: "As a political counselor to the President as well as the chief law enforcement officer, the Attorney General was in a good position to reconcile the tension between the President's duty to enforce the law and his occasional duty to dispense with it, for mercy ' 
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So how did things go wrong? It appears that at exactly the same time that clemency grants dropped-the 1980s-the clemency process became more complex. 51 The drop-off is well-defined in the Pardon Attorney's published statistics, which extend back to 1900. 52 Considering both commutations of sentence and pardons, granted petitions almost always exceeded 100 per year. During the Reagan Administration, they dipped below that level and then crashed under George H.W. Bush, who granted less than 100 over his entire four-year term. 53 This trend is particularly notable given that incarceration rates (and thus the number of people who might seek clemency) were rising at the same time that the number of clemency grants was falling. This means that the change in clemency grant rates was severe, with a sharp shift between Carter and Reagan. In order: President Kennedy granted 36% of the pardon and commutation petitions filed, Johnson 31%, Nixon 36%, Ford 27%, 54 Carter 21%, Reagan 12%, George H.W. Bush 5%, Clinton 6%, and George W. Bush 2%.
55
The crucial shift in procedure, which corresponds with this Carter/Reagan breaking point, seems to have happened almost imperceptibly. At the end of the Carter Administration, Attorney General Griffin Bell delegated responsibility for approving and transmitting clemency recommendations to his subordinates. 56 This was formalized in the Reagan Administration under Attorney General William French Smith, and the review and recommendation function of the Attorney General passed to the Deputy Attorney General ("DAG"). 59 adding two additional levels of review. 60 In sum, what seems like a simple delegation in responsibility actually created significant new hurdles within the process.
While there is no doubt that this shift in procedure corresponded with the sudden drop in grant rates, is it fair to claim causation? It could be that the same retributivist theories of justice that brought us sharp increases in incarceration rates through tough new sentencing laws also convinced presidents from Reagan to Obama not to grant convicted criminals a break through clemency, as Rachel Barkow has argued. 61 While political shifts towards retribution played some role in restricting clemency, 62 they do not explain the entirety of the abrupt fall in grant rates. Three arguments cut the other way.
First, as Margaret Colgate Love has pointed out, a shift in political philosophy towards retribution might explain the drop in commutations (which shorten a term of imprisonment) but not the corresponding drop in the granting of pardons (which restore rights such as the ability to possess a gun for people who have completed prison terms already). 63 Pardon recipients have paid the principal price of hardship demanded in a sentence 
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64
Second, a societal enthusiasm for retribution and antagonism to rehabilitation does not explain the mixed clemency record of Barack Obama, who did not seem to hold a retributivist theory of justice, 65 yet failed to reverse the clemency slide during the first six years of his presidency. 66 In fact, the same week in 2016 that Obama took a group of clemency recipients to lunch in Washington with less than a year to go in his presidency, 67 The same points also rebut the argument that clemency was diminished because of the "Willie Horton Effect"-that is, the theory that clemency and related programs became disfavored in response to the infamous Willie Horton political advertisement that George H.W. Bush successfully used in the 1988 election. These advertisements depicted a man who committed a rape while out on furlough from prison. 72 While the specter of Willie Horton may still scare politicians and deter statutory reform 73 or consideration of the reinstatement of parole, 74 it should not affect pardon decisions where the defendant is free from prison already or second-term presidents who have no more political races before them (most recently, Reagan, George W. Bush, and Obama). And yet even in those situations, we see a drop in grants.
Neither theory nor politics alone created the failure of clemency we have seen over the past three decades. A primary culprit is the clemency review process, which emerged in the 1980s. The truth that it is the process that failed, rather than simply the will of the presidents we have elected recently, is reflected in the bare fact that the last three presidents have each complained that they did not see good clemency applications, 75 even though the system was bloated with over-sentenced drug defendants. Good cases were there; they just got beat up and run off as they ran through the ricketline that the clemency process had become.
The Carter/Reagan procedural change did two things, each of which made the system more inconsistent, inefficient, and unreliable. First, this new process inserted new levels of review. Second, a key player inserted 70 
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The next section explores these procedural changes in greater depth.
B. The Clemency System Today
Even before the implementation of President Obama's Clemency Project 2014 (which added bureaucracy), 76 the clemency review process in recent administrations involved seven sequential levels of review traversing four different buildings in Washington D.C. The below section walks through the existing process and describes the layers of bureaucracy that Clemency Project 2014 added on top of that existing disaster, all before discussing the problems with this system and the effects of negative decision bias.
The Basic Process
Little has been written about the actual mechanics of the clemency process as it operates today. 77 Former Pardon Attorney staffer Sam Morison has argued that the need to protect the privacy of clemency seekers and the need to preserve frank advice to the president has led to a system that "is to a large extent shielded from public scrutiny, which inevitably shrouds it with a certain air of mystery." 78 Here, we will attempt to lift that shroud of mystery and describe the process which has encased and befuddled the Constitutional imperative of pardoning. Setting aside for now the mechanics of Clemency Project 2014, a contemporary clemency petition will be considered in turn by the staff of the Pardon Attorney, the Pardon Attorney, the staff of the DAG, the DAG, the staff of the White House Counsel, the White House Counsel, and finally by the President. 79 No hearing is required or provided for at any point. Unless an attorney or someone else has compiled letters of support or other documents for the petitioner, it is generally this bare-bones form that will arrive at the Pardon Attorney's office and be assigned to a staff member. First, an initial screening is performed, looking to whether the form is complete and basic eligibility is met 87 (for example, that the defendant is a federal convict, rather than one who was convicted in a state court). 88 If a commutation petition passes that screen, 89 the staffer begins an investigation by contacting the warden of the prison to request three key documents: the judgment of conviction, the presentence investigation report, and the most recent prison progress report for that inmate. 90 With these documents in hand, the staffer can independently evaluate the defendant's criminal history, crime of conviction, and conduct and achievement in prison. 81 The role of the Pardon Attorney staff in conducting these investigations and drafting recommendations is important in the same way that an FBI investigation is important in a criminal case-it is foundational and shapes all that follows. There is a fair amount of discretion built into this role, and it is expected that some staffers will pursue and support a good case more than others. Historically, some staffers have been clearly antagonistic to the project: one former deputy "arrived in the pardons office with a duplicate of a Monopoly 'Get Out of Jail' card [with] a red-circle-and-slash 'no' symbol over it," 97 while others were presumably more open-minded.
b. The Pardon Attorney
The Pardon Attorney is ultimately responsible for the recommendation that is sent up the chain through the remaining levels of review. 98 Certainly, the Pardon Attorney's viewpoint will vary depending on who holds the job. 91 . Morison notes that further investigation is done if "an initial review of the petition indicates that it might have some substantive merit." Id. at 37-38.
92. More investigation is also conducted if the petition is likely to draw public attention, involves a public figure, or 
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107 Instead, they must rely on the representations of the people at the bottom of the chain.
c. The Staff of the Deputy Attorney General
The file, now reduced to a written recommendation, traverses over to the office of the DAG. Recent DAGs have delegated an initial review of clemency cases to staff members. 108 Each staff member brings their own experience and viewpoint in the same way that the Pardon Attorney staffers will vary in outlook. One would expect the DAG to provide guidance for this review, but the very fact that staffers review each recommendation suggests that they have some discretion in the process, at the very least in questioning or reaffirming the opinion of the Pardon Attorney.
109
At this point, another subtle but important element comes into play. While the Pardon Attorney and his or her staff are specialists, the rest of the reviewers-the DAG staff, the DAG, the White House Counsel staff, the White House Counsel, and the President 110 -are all generalists who have a plate full of other responsibilities, many of which (e.g., reacting to police shootings or terrorist events) can hijack their schedule for days or weeks.
111
Given the many and complicated tasks before them, it should not be a surprise when clemency falls far down the priority list on any given day.
d. The Deputy Attorney General
Since the 1980s, the DAG has had the responsibility of reviewing clemency cases and transmitting them to the White House. 112 The DAG has 106. Id.
107.
Id. This makes a lie of one of the instructions for that petition, which is to be addressed to the "President of the United States." U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 1.1, Submission of Petition; Form to be Used; Contents of Petition, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/pardon/rules-governing-petitionsexecutive-clemency (last updated Jan. 13, 2015).
108. This step has been confirmed in discussion with some of those involved. This means that the DAG is the direct supervisor of U.S. Attorneys and their Assistants-the very people who prosecute cases and who have the least to gain by clemency, which undoes the outcomes that they have pursued.
The DAG lacks the continuity of the line prosecutors, however. Unlike the Assistant U.S. Attorneys and the Pardon Attorney, the DAG is a political appointee who requires Senate confirmation, 114 and is thus subjected to a political appointment process that creates differentiation (and subsequent disparity) from one administration to the next.
Former Obama DAG James Cole perhaps inadvertently emphasized that clemency can be a relatively minor part of a crowded plate. In describing his efforts on clemency, a reporter who talked to Cole explained that Cole carried home "piles of documents" on fall Saturdays and sorted through clemency cases at his kitchen table. 115 Cole's successor, Sally Yates, continued the theme, and she served as DAG when the Obama Administration's clemency push was in full effect. Arguing that Yates was deeply involved, Associate DAG Matthew Axelrod told the Washington Post that Yates "takes a grocery bag of petitions home and spends her weekends reading them."
116
The image of the DAG sifting through reports at the kitchen table while a football game plays in the background does not depict clemency as a top priority-that is, the kind of important work that one actually does at the office. The sorting-through of human lives being seen as weekend work is simply one symptom of this dysfunctional system and the primary role it gives to generalists. 
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The DAG is no simple pass-through, however. Pardon Attorney Deborah Leff resigned in January 2016, and writer Gregory Korte of USA Today later obtained her letter of resignation. 117 In that letter to DAG Yates, Leff laid bare a few of the ghosts in the machine: "I have been deeply troubled by the decision to deny the Pardon Attorney all access to the Office of the White House Counsel, even to share the reasons for our determinations in the increasing number of cases where you have reversed our recommendations." 118 In terms of process, Leff revealed something important: that the DAG often reversed her recommendations, and apparently forwarded to the White House only her own view and recommendation without including the contrary view of the Pardon Attorney. Given this power, the importance of the DAG's role can no longer be doubted.
e. The White House Counsel Staff
The case now moves to a third physical location, as the staff of the White House Counsel is lodged in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building within the White House complex. 119 There, a staffer will review whatever the DAG forwarded.
120 Again, as with the DAG's staff, this is just one of many tasks handled by a small group of people. Other jobs assigned to this same office include advising the President on the legal aspects of national security issues and vetting judicial nominees. 121 Naturally, these other tasks will take priority when, say, a new Supreme Court nominee is being selected. The final step before the President is the White House Counsel. This position has a particularly political inflection, since the Counsel must advise the President on the legal issues that governing and politics so often create. 123 Clemency cases must seem a necessary but distracting task at times. 124 That sense of annoyance seems to be reflected in an apparently sarcastic remark that White House Counsel Neil Eggleston made at a time when activists were demanding more action on clemency: "No more eating, sleeping or drinking until we get all these commutations done," he claimed to have told his staff.
125
Other White House Counsel have been more proactive than dismissive, and at least one hatched a plan for a new and better structure. President Obama's first Counsel, Greg Craig, proposed that a commission located outside of the Department of Justice handle clemency, reporting directly to the President. 126 Craig explained later that it was clear to him that " [t] his is an important executive power that has wasted away because it's been badly managed and politically mishandled," 127 but nothing was done.
g. The President
The ultimate generalist, the President makes the final decision and signs the warrant for clemency. Barack Obama clearly cared about the project of clemency, a fact reflected in the letter he sent to each clemency recipient. 128 Given that interest, one wonders why his administration was so 
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Clemency Project 2014
From the day of his first inauguration, President Obama was urged to proactively address clemency. That urging came from someone who would know: his predecessor, George W. Bush. As the two rode together in a limousine to the inauguration ceremony, Bush advised Obama to "announce a pardon policy early on, and stick to it."
129 Bush had good reason to give this advice: the dysfunctional clemency process plagued his own administration. Two of his White House Counsels, Harriet Miers and Fred Fielding, grew frustrated as they struggled to make it work. 130 Miers even implored the Pardon Attorney and DAG for more favorable recommendations at a personal meeting, to no avail.
131
Obama passed on his first and best chance to amend the clemency process when he ignored the plan presented by White House Counsel Greg Craig for a system using a commission established outside of the Department of Justice.
132 Predictably, the existing system worked no better for him than it had for his immediate predecessors. Four months later, a more complete plan emerged, 139 one that Attorney General Eric Holder suggested could lead to the early release of some 10,000 federal prisoners.
140
In short, Clemency Project 2014 was to receive statements of interest from prisoners, screen them for eligibility under defined criteria, then assign the cases to attorneys who had volunteered to work on these cases pro bono. 141 Organization of this effort was outsourced to five groups: the American Bar Association, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Federal Defenders. 
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145 While Obama finished with a total of 1,715 commutations and 212 pardons granted, he also denied over 25,000 clemency petitions and failed to rule on another 9,400 received during his presidency. 146 The uneven results, too, left some with the impression that the process was a "lottery."
147
Part of the problem was beyond the control of the Clemency Project, created by a pool of pro bono lawyers who were largely inexperienced in the complicated field of federal sentencing law. 148 This problem was compounded when those with the most experience in that area-the federal defenders-were largely pushed out of the process by the ruling of an administrative law judge.
149
On top of the unwieldy process described above, 150 the Clemency Project constructed its own wobbly structure comprising of redundant reviews and part-time experts. Those 35,000-plus cases from prisoners were first sent to the Clemency Project, which did a minimal screen for basic disqualifying factors. 151 From there, four more principle points of review 
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were established (for a total of five, including the initial screen): (1) a pro bono attorney assessed the case, then (2) a "screening committee" reviewed a summary prepared by the attorney, followed by (3) a similar, redundant review by a "steering committee,"-all before a petition was even written up-and finally (4) the petition was reviewed again by the Project, 152 before being submitted to the Pardon Attorney to run through the entire previously described gauntlet within the administration.
In all, a clemency case traversing the Clemency Project and then the administration would face 12 different reviews-no less than a dozen chokepoints with different personnel and filters.
Even given the built-in disadvantages the Clemency Project faced, it is easy to imagine a better system if the administration was intent on using outside groups and pro bono attorneys to evaluate and prepare clemency petitions. For example, instead of having redundant reviews after a case was assigned to an attorney, those resources could have been devoted to a "hard screen" at the start of the process, which would only allow the best cases to proceed. Those best cases could be assigned to attorneys who would go directly to drafting a petition, which then the Project could review. Presumably, this route was not pursued because the Clemency Project did not have the resources to gather documents and conduct a hard screen at the front end of the process. Sadly, the same type of resource failure that may have prevented the administration from creating a more functional system may have also barred the Clemency Project's ability to do a better job of providing and guiding outside attorneys.
There is deep irony in this stinginess, of course. Hiring 100 lawyers for one year at $100,000 a year apiece would have cost $10 million. That seems like a lot of money. However, consider just one case, a famous 153 one: that of Weldon Angelos. 154 Angelos was caught selling a small amount of marijuana while possessing-but not brandishing or using-a firearm, on two occasions. 155 By charging the firearms in such a way that the sentences stacked on top of one another, 156 
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158 After his clemency petition had been pending for three-and-a-half years, Angelos was released from prison (on grounds other than clemency) in 2016, 159 42 years early. Given that the cost of imprisoning someone in the federal system is about $30,000 per year, 160 the cost of holding Angelos for the full remaining term (even accounting for time off for good conduct) would be well over $1 million.
In other words, one case, just one, could produce 1/10 of the total cost required to have hired 100 lawyers for one year to do clemency right. One hundred cases like his would have produced a government surplus of $90 million, and a thousand would yield $990 million.
C. The Effect of a Bias in Favor of Negative Decisions
The administration's clemency evaluation system described here is "vertical"-that is, each level of review operates only if the preceding level completes its task, and the case moves vertically up the chain. 161 Importantly, strong incentives at each level mitigate in favor of a negative decision rather than a positive one. 162 After all, if a person is granted clemency and commits a crime, the administration's failure is very public. 163 Making a negative decision and denying clemency, though, 161. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the actors, and responsibilities of those involved, in the current federal clemency system).
162. Social scientists have described an "Omission Bias" which leads to favoring inaction over action. This has been used to explain the way in which some parents choose not to vaccinate their children; there, both vaccinating or not may pose risks, and this leads to inaction as a default (even where the risk of not vaccinating is in fact greater), because personal culpability adheres more strongly to an affirmative choice. carries very little risk. Thus, positive decisions are high-risk, and negative decisions are low-risk. To put it another way, the cost of a positive decision is borne publicly by the decisionmakers (in the form of risk), while the cost of a negative decision is borne privately by the inmate. This bakes in a negative bias at each level of the process.
164
The effect of this bias is compounded by the multiple decisionmakers in this vertical process. Let's say that 2,000 people apply for clemency and half are good candidates. However, the decision makers are cautious, because of the bias built into the system. So, of the 1,000 good candidates, they recommend only half; this caution proceeds up each level leading half the group to be removed at each stage. At the first level, 500 candidates pass through; 250 get through a second review, and 125 survive the third. After the fourth review, 62 make it past, then 31 from the fifth review. Fifteen slide through the sixth review, and in the end only seven or eight receive relief, of the 1,000 good candidates.
The more reviewers there are, the worse the effects of the bias towards negative decisions becomes-because that bias is personal, what matters is how many persons evaluate a petition in succession. While I do not suggest that such uniform rates of decision apply to this process, the underlying principle holds true. The strong political incentive to deny petitions is magnified by the number of levels of review in play. 165 In the end, we should not be surprised that the federal clemency system doesn't work-it is structured not to work. At best (which some would argue we have seen at the end of Obama's second term), it allows for a burst of clemency at the end of an administration; a rush that is both dangerous 166 and unnecessary. 165. Admittedly, the political effects will vary from one level to another. It is the President, of course, who would suffer the most direct political impact should a clemency recipient commit a heinous crime. Love, Administration of the President's Pardon Power, supra note 42, at 104.
166. The danger in a rushed process is multifaceted: unworthy or dangerous people may be released, political connections may be rewarded over merit, and worthy candidates may be forgotten.
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II. BETTER EXAMPLES: STATE AND FEDERAL
The current federal clemency system-a bureaucratic disaster coursing through four federal buildings and at least seven sets of hands-is the worst clemency evaluation system in the history of the United States (with the possible exception of Rhode Island's process, which sends clemency consideration through the state senate for "advice and consent"). 167 Our previous mechanisms served the federal system better than the current one, 168 and no state system includes the federal process's toxic combination of endless review and a central role for prosecutors. 169 To see what a functioning clemency system might look like, we need to look into state systems and federal history.
A. State Systems
A Diversity of Systems
Even a cursory examination of state systems reveals a fascinating truth: there seems to be no correlation between liberalism and broad grants of clemency, or political conservatism and stinginess. In fact, we find some of the most functional and effective systems in states like South Carolina, while my own famously progressive state (Minnesota) issues pardons sparingly. 170 Many state systems (including those described below) offer features that are lacking in the current federal system, beyond efficiency and consistent productivity: political diversity among decisionmakers, transparency, and (importantly) an opportunity for victims or victims' family members to have a voice in the process.
Perhaps the most striking indictment of the federal clemency system is the bare fact that not a single state has adopted that system of redundant reviews, or anything remotely like it. 171 described it after a thorough survey, the states 172 fall into three general categories. 173 The first includes six states that leave pardoning almost entirely to an independent board. 174 The second describes the 21 states where the governor shares the pardon power with a board or (in Rhode Island) the legislature. 175 The third is comprised of 23 states where the governor has the sole power to pardon, though 18 of these states require an advisory consultation with a board that investigates the cases.
176
The state systems vary not only in their construction, but in their effectiveness and fairness. They certainly are not immune from scandal, either. For example, outgoing Mississippi Governor Hailey Barbour granted full pardons to 193 felons on his last day in office, including a man who had shot and killed his wife while she held their infant. 177 Still, there is much to learn from the higher-functioning systems.
178
In her 2012 survey of state practices, Margaret Colgate Love identified 14 states that demonstrate well-functioning systems that provided "frequent and regular" pardon grants: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and South Dakota. 179 That list is striking for its deviation from the red/blue divide we are used to, further establishing that fair and efficient administration of clemency can be and is accomplished by either party. It's not politics that matters, it's process.
So, what kind of process do we see in those states? First, five of the six states where highly independent boards make clemency decisionsAlabama, Georgia, Idaho, Connecticut, and South Carolina-are also among the 14 members of the "frequent and regular" list, while the sixth such jurisdiction, Utah, misses the cut largely because the board in that state conceived and managed as the federal government's, which has failed to evolve with the changing needs of the presidency and the justice system over the past one hundred years").
172 178. Some state systems are distinct from the federal clemency system because of the effects of parole. The federal system does not have parole, but for states that retain that mechanism, parole will largely serve the function of commutations-that is, shortening existing sentences-while the clemency system will largely address pardons (which generally restore rights to those who have fulfilled a term of imprisonment).
179. Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process, supra note 2, at 756-68.
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Fewer Hands, More Mercy 493 only gets three to five requests for pardon a year. 180 There is a remarkable correlation between high-functioning clemency systems and the use of an independent board as primary arbiter. 181 Moreover, in each of the other states with high-functioning systems, we see a board playing a significant role in decision-making. 182 Thus, one common thread is clear: while other factors (local tradition or culture, for example) likely play a role, high-functioning state systems use clemency boards.
Why does this correlation exist? Notably, the clemency board system is just as horizontal as the federal system is vertical. While the reviewers in the federal system are stacked one atop the other in a hierarchy-Pardon Attorney, DAG, White House Counsel, President-the members of a board are relative equals. One strength of that structure is that it allows for deliberation and consensus in a way that a vertical hierarchy does not. In other words, in a horizontal system, deciders with different filters must directly consult one another to harmonize their views. The horizontal federal system consecutively applies different filters in a way that allows nearly everything to be strained out. 
Delaware
We see the dynamic of a horizontal system at work if we look more closely at a high-functioning state: Delaware. There, the Governor has the pardon power, but the state constitution sets out that: no pardon, or reprieve for more than six months, shall be granted, nor sentence commuted, except upon the recommendation in writing of a majority of the Board of Pardons after full hearing; and such recommendation, with the reasons therefor at length, shall be filed and recorded in the office of the Secretary of State . . . .
184
That short bit of constitutional text establishes three things, all of which differentiate Delaware from the federal system. First, a Board of 180. Id. 181. Id. at 744 (concluding that states with independent pardon boards are effective in issuing numerous pardons).
182. Id. at 756-68. 183. See supra Part II.C (asserting that the horizontal system also avoids the multiplication of negative decision bias because the group makes one decision collectively).
184. DEL. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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Fewer Hands, More Mercy 497 weeks earlier. 214 That Board left behind two lasting legacies, both of which have been largely ignored by history: the uncontroversial pardon of thousands, and a comprehensive report about how this was accomplished. 215 Ford intended the Board to be temporary 216 and gave it precisely one year to complete its work, 217 ending on September 15, 1975. 218 The goal was to create a "program of conditional clemency for roughly 13,000 civilians and 100,000 servicemen who had committed draft or military absence offenses" during the Vietnam War. 219 The Ford Clemency Board worked. Yet, it is telling that few remember it; after all, we remember disasters, not quiet successes.
C. Lessons from the States and the Ford Clemency Board
The examples of the Ford Clemency Board and the high-functioning states set out a few simple commonalities and promise the possibility of features our federal system now lacks.
There are three strong commonalities among systems that work. Highfunctioning systems rely on boards, which serve to flatten out the process and force consensus among diverse voices. Because they consider petitions as a group rather than consecutively, they avoid redundancies and maintain consistency. 235 Second, the more independence the board has, the more likely it is that the system will be efficient and offer frequent and regular grants of clemency. 236 This should not surprise us. An independent board gives a political actor such as a governor or president some political "cover" on tough decisions.
Third, diverse views on a board seemingly enhance the success of the larger project. President Ford intentionally sought out diverse voices (even on the subject of the Vietnam War), while the structure of the Delaware and South Carolina systems ensure that the makeup of their boards avoid monoculture.
The recipe for a working clemency system is short and sweet: it requires a horizontal structure centered on a well-chosen board that is both diverse and independent.
III. CRAFTING A BETTER FEDERAL SYSTEM
A. The Use of a Clemency Board
Obviously, a central feature of a new federal clemency system should be the replacement of the vertical hierarchy we have now with a horizontal model built around a clemency board. Bureaucracy, particularly redundant levels of review, unduly fetters the proper and constitutional exercise of mercy.
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Fewer Hands, More Mercy 501 because each official has different interests. For example, the DAG may resist or ignore such an imperative to placate line prosecutors who previously have been instructed to prosecute gun crimes aggressively.
B. Diversity and Independence
A federal clemency board should be diverse in background and ideology, and have a relative level of independence, particularly from the Department of Justice.
242
The models of Delaware, South Carolina, and the Ford Clemency Board offer three different paths to diversity. Delaware uses a variety of elected officials, which will usually ensure, at least, that both major parties are represented (provided that those officials either serve through several administrations or are elected independently). That model, however, does not align with the federal system, because only two executive officials (the President and Vice President) are elected while others are appointed, ensuring a certain sameness of outlook. South Carolina's system, with one representative from each congressional district, offers at least geographic diversity and in practice seems to have allowed for racial and vocational diversity. In the federal system, it would be possible to replicate such a system by appointing one commissioner from each Court of Appeals Circuit. That would do little to encourage racial and ideological diversity. Similarly, the diversity of the Ford Board was achieved only through the intentional actions of the executive, and President Ford lived at a time when bipartisan cooperation was common. It is unlikely that self-restraint would be enough to ensure ideological diversity in today's political environment.
Previously, Rachel Barkow and I have suggested a clemency board where slots are filled by people of certain expertise; for example, we might require a commission to include a former federal prosecutor, a former federal defender, a former federal judge, a former federal probation officer, and a former police officer, among others.
243 Such a structure would ensure a variety of experiential knowledge and background, allowing for a fuller discussion of cases. Our inclusion of "former" in those descriptions was intentional; a board in charge of running federal clemency would benefit from being staffed with full-time, rather than part-time, commissioners.
242. Because of the constitutional directive that clemency rests with the executive, independence from the president is not a relevant goal.
243. Barkow & Osler, supra note 238, at 21.
